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Abstract
Nowadays software enables to control more complex processes, but at the same time it is also responsible for the
welfare of humans and environment. A failure in a software program can influence the technical process with
unforeseeable consequences. Generally the safety of a computer-controlled system depends on a complex
interaction between technical process, controller software and human task. Classic methods for safety analysis
mostly are specialized to consider one part of the system and the analysis is a brainstorming procedure. In this
paper a model-based approach for safety analysis is discussed. All parts of the computer controlled systems are
first described with the help of a qualitative modeling. Then the different qualitative models are combined to a
unique model of a computer-controlled system. Based on this model a computer supported safety analysis can be
realized. The model enables the analysis of the interaction between the system parts even by considering any
multiple failure.
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1 Introduction
The safety requirements for computer-controlled systems are defined more and more strictly, particularly then, if
the health of human beings is immediately concerned. Such systems can be divided into three different parts: the
technical process (which must be controlled), the control software (which contains the automation concept and
functions to prevent serious accidents) and the human as operator, who normally supervises the whole system,
see figure 1, [1]. In dependence of the degree of automation the role of these parts can differ, nevertheless the
interaction between them is complex. Failure of the control software can influence the technical process with
unforeseeable consequences. Defects of elements of the technical process can impair the regular behavior control
software in similar way. Wrong human interventions affect the technical process directly or indirectly by the
control software. Furthermore, the increasing complexity of computer-controlled systems makes it harder to
overview the whole interaction.
This fact can be explained with an example of a modern airplane. While at the beginning of aeronautics the pilot
was depending only on his instinctive perception, nowadays dozens of controllers prepare the necessary flight
information for the pilot, show him the optimal route or warn of dangerous situations. The yaw damper steered
by the computer evaluates the information a thousand times faster and therefore reacts upon unexpected events
better than human beings. The interactions between airplane, control software and pilot must work perfect. Quite
a number of airplane accidents already have shown, what happens if a sensor fails: the computer misinterprets
the information and the pilot is no longer in a position to handle the situation correctly.
Technical Process
Control Software Human
Interactions
Computer-controlled system
Figure 1: General structure of a computer-controlled system
2 Classic Safety Analysis
Safety analysis offers the potential to determine whether the risk associated with a computer-controlled system is
acceptable in relation to the overall system risk, in context of defined failure assumptions. In general, classic
methods for safety analysis are specialized to analyze one of the three mentioned system parts. Methods which
are developed for considering the technical process, like FMEA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis), HAZOP
(Hazard and Operability Analysis) or FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), are less effective for software models [2].
An other disadvantage of most classic methods is, that the principal step is a brainstorming of all kinds of
possible events, actions, system situations and possible consequences of failures [6]. The analyst must be an
expert and must know all the details of the system. Therefore the quality of the result depends on his knowledge
and normally is hard to reproduce by an other person. Other problems of classic methods are proofing the
completeness of the analysis and the evaluation of multiple failures.
For a new safety analysis approach it is important to consider the whole computer-controlled system, not only its
parts separately. Furthermore in the age of computer science the brainstorming procedure of the classic methods
should be supported by a software tool. Then most of the problems coming up with brainstorming can be solved.
To make the system analyzable by a computer, an appropriate model of a computer-controlled system must be
used. Because of the complex structure of such systems, the requirements for an appropriate model are very
demanding and difficult to realize. This model should be able to describe the behavior of the technical process,
the control software and the human task. It must deal with the complexity of the systems and it must be
developed especially for the mean of safety analysis. This includes that possible states or situations of the
computer-controlled system must be evaluated in respect to their potential risk and probability.
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3 Model Based Safety Analysis
A research field at the Institute of Industrial Automation and Software Engineering (IAS) deals with model
based safety analysis [3]. The computer shall support the user at the execution of the safety analysis. Based on
the available system documents the technical process, the control software and the human task are first modeled
separately, then joined together to a uniform model.
With the help of the uniform qualitative model the computer can investigate, whether dangerous situations can
appear in the real system or not by considering the interactions of the three system parts. The effects of multiple
failures to the complete system can be analyzed, too. The computer relieves the experts by calculating all
possible situations of the computer-controlled system by combining the three different qualitative models.
The user must examine these situations, especially the critical ones. It's upon his knowledge to decide if these
critical situations are probable or not. If so, additional safety functions (or a redesign) of the system are
necessary. The situations also help to locate design failures of the control software, figure 2. In the following,
each step of the model-based safety analysis will be discussed.
situation
not
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no corrective
 measures
additional 
safety functions
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exceeds 
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Development of a computer-controlled system
 Technical
  Process (TP) 
 Control
 Software  (SW) 
 Human
 Task  (HT)
Qualitative modelling of the system parts
Composition of the single system models
Analysis: evaluation of critical situations and 
transition of the system
Figure 2: Model-based approach for safety analysis
4 Qualitative Modeling
By using qualitative models it is possible to describe complex systems even with uncompleted knowledge [4].
As modeling language we use the SQMA-approach (Situation-based Qualitative Modeling and Analysis).
SQMA is a component-oriented modeling method [5]. First, all components of a system are described qualitative
independent of their function in the system. The structure of the system represents the rules of the interactions
between the components. Within this assumption a model of the whole computer-controlled system can be
generated by the computer.
For modelling a system has to be divided into subsystems or at least into components. These components can be
real (such as technical components) or fictive (such as software component). The first step is a black-box
consideration of the defined component. All important terminals of the component are considered. The quantities
on the terminals are expressed by using interval variables. Therefor the value of these quantities are spited up
into ranges. Figure 3 shows a short example of a fluid level quantity. The chosen intervals are [0,0], (0, 100) and
[100, ¥). SQMA offers the possibility to give the intervals a comment (or interpretation) e.g. the intervall [0,0]
stands for empty.
0 50 100 fluid
level
[0,0]
emtpy
(0, 100)
filled
[100, ..)
overflow
legend
  [  = inclusive
  (  = exclusive
Figure 3: Qualitative variable based on intervals
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After describing all quantities a white box consideration takes place. The interrelation of the quantities is a rule-
based description (e.g. if there is a inflow into a tank, the fluid level must rise). An other very important use of a
rule-based description is the classification of not-intended and dangerous situations (e.g. if the door of a tank is
open and the fluid level is greater than 50 gallons then there is a outflow through the door). After the black and
white-box consideration the computer is able to build up a so-called situation-table.
After having modeled each component, the connections between them have to be described by using a netlist.
Finally an algorithm combines all situations of the component model. The algorithm considers questions like the
following: Is it possible that, component “A” can be in situation “n” and at the same time component “B” is in
situation “m”. For each combination, the quantities of a component have to be checked with the system
equations. If the result of all system equations for a special combination of situations (system situation) is true,
then this system situation can happen in reality. Then an even more important question must be answered: Does
the system contain dangerous system situations? – When modeling the components we classified different kinds
of situations with an attribute. With these attributes a computer can quickly separate the system situations into
dangerous, not-intended or regular. Now an analyst doesn’t need to think about possible combinations. He only
considers the result of the computer analysis. The analyst has to interpret the result himself by considering the
likelihood of these system situations and whether prevention is necessary or not.
In the following section we illustrate our approach by an example.
5 Qualitative Modelling of the System Parts
Figure 4 shows a technical system, in which a homogenizing process is to be run. An inlet valve supplies a liquid
into a tank with an integrated mixer. The liquid is to be homogenized and to be removed afterwards by the drain
valve. The tank has a door, which has to be locked during the process cycle.
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Figure 4: A computer-controlled system "homogenising plant"
The system was automated with an open-loop structure, therefore an operator has control functions like starting,
terminating and interrupting the process. Furthermore he can modify the value for the level of the tank (desired
value specification). The controller is receiving the requests from the operator, checking them and thereupon
sending the suitable messages. Also, the controller must prevent safety critical states of the technical process.
The controller was implemented in C++ .
Now, with the help of the technique of SQMA this system is modeled. It will demonstrate how complex the
interaction between technical process, automation software and human control interventions is even for such a
small system. First, all parts of the homogenizing plant are regarded and modeled individually. Subsequently, the
three resulting models are joined to the unique model of the automation system. With the analysis of the unique
model, predictions about the behavior and about the safety of the system can be made.
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5.1 The Technical Process
The technical process represents the physical behavior of the system. The process is a typical continuous flow
process. The technical system consists of two identically constructed electromagnetic valves and a tank with an
integrated mixer. The technical system is usually described with PI1- and process flow diagrams, which serve as
a base for the qualitative modeling of the technical process.
The qualitative model of the technical process contains 50 different situations, which can be understood as
scenarios for different operations modes. The situations are classified according to their meaning for safety.
Table 1 shows as an example for different situation of the technical process. The header of the table shows the
single components of the technical process. The dangerous situation can be read as following: There is an inflow
into the filled tank, because the inlet valve is open. The drain valve is close, so there is no outflow from the tank.
The situation is classified as dangerous, because the mixer is running while the door of the tank is open.
inlet valve tank drain valve status
.. .. .. ..
closed empty, mixer off, door closed open intended
open contains fluid , inflow, mixer on, door open closed dangerous
.. .. .. ..
Table 1. An extract of the situation table of the technical process.
5.2 The Control Software
For this system the controller software was developed with the method UML-RT. UML-RT stands for Unified
Modeling Language - Real Time and supports the development process of software projects [8]. With UML-RT
functions of the software are divided into components, the so-called capsules. These capsules can only
communicate by messages on defined channels. Messages have a signal part and optionally a data part. For
further information about UML-RT, see “Modeling Language Guide" [8].
plant specifications
plant controller
mixerMessages
doorLockMessages
doorState
levels
inletValveMessages
drainValveMessages
userMessages newLevelValues
parameter
Figure 5: Structure model of the controller software
                                                                
1 PI: Piping and Instrument Diagram
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Figure 5 shows the structure model of the controller software in the UML-RT notation. It contains the capsule
plant specifications and the capsule plant controller. The capsule plant controller controls and monitors the
desired process sequences, while the capsule plant specifications contains the data of the technical process e.g.
the tank volume. It also realizes the dialog with the user. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows which process
information and manipulated variables were selected for controlling the homogenizing process. The interface to
the user (userMessages, newLevels) and to the technical process (inletValveMessage, mixerMessage,...) are
represented in the structure model as communications ports (black-and-white rectangles)2.
The behavior of the capsules is described with Statecharts. They are extended state machines, based on Harel’s
statecharts [9]. A transition is triggered by a certain event (signal). Optionally, further conditions for a transition
can be specified, e.g. the data part of a messages can be checked for certain values. The statechart of the capsule
plant controller is shown in Figure 6.
The definition of the states is oriented on the desired process states. The state initialization , like the name
implies, is called within the initialization of the system. At this point the valves are closed, user inputs are
enabled and the door to the tank is unlocked. If the user starts the system, the plant controller changes into the
state filling/mixing. This state opens the inlet valve, starts the mixer, refuses further user inputs and locks the
door of the tank. When reaching the desired level, the inlet valve is closed and the capsule plant controller
changes into the status mixing.
The user can terminate the process at any time. In this case the state draining is reached, the mixer motor is
stopped and the drain valve is opened. Finally when the tank is empty, the plant controller switches into the state
ready and the process can be started again. The state stopped is reached by the controller when irregular events
occur (e.g. abort by the user or the door is open when the tank is being filled). This safe state will warn the user
and stop the process.
initialization filling/mixing
mixing
draining
I
t:{humanMessages = terminate }
t:{ humanMessages = start }
ready
t:{ level = 0}
stopped
error
error
error
e:{inletValveMessages = close,
drainValveMessages = close,
mixerMessages = off,
doorLockMessages = open,
newLevels = enable}
e:{inletValveMessages = open
mixerMessages = on,
doorLockMessages = close,
newLevels = disable}
t:{ level = newLevel }
e:{inletValveMessages = close}
e:{ mixerMessages = off,
drainValveMessages = open}
e:{ drainValveMessages = close }
e:{humanMessages = alarm}
Figure 6. Statechart of the capsule plant controller
                                                                
2 The different patterns of the ports depends on the definition of the respective protocol and is insignificant for
the understanding of this report
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The function of the capsule plant specifications is to check the users inputs for their validity and to output
suitable messages to the user. Its behavior is also described with a statechart. Its state are ready, inputs_blocked,
inputs_ok and inputs_illegal.
After discussing the design of the controller software, we are going to translate the UML-RT-design into a
qualitative model. The goal is to generate scenarios in form of situations for the behavior of the control software.
First the capsules plant controller and plant specification are described separately. Therefore the signal and data
part of a message must be expressed by using interval variables. The values of the qualitative variables stand for
the different contents of a messages. During the black box modeling, the complete situation space is regarded.
The situations describe all possible combinations of the messages from a capsule. In contrast to the modeling of
the technical process, there is no physical law for the behavior of the software which can be consulted for the
formulation of the situation rules. With UML-RT the behavior of the capsules were specified by statecharts,
which permit only predetermined combinations of the messages. A statecharts diagram can be expressed with the
help of interval arithmetic, if the following points are observed:
· the trigger condition for a transition, i.e. the event which caused the state
· the modification (actions), which are caused by a state
· the history of the preceding states.
For this paper more detailed information of the transformation is of no importance. The white-box modeling step
consists of the transformation of the state-transition diagram into situation rules. After considering these
situation rules, only the situations which describe the behavior of the capsule remains. Due to its specification,
4096 different situations were combinatorial possible for the capsule plant controller. With the situations rules
for this capsule only 108 situations remained. Similarly to the modeling of technical components, groups of
situations can be commentated. Figure 7 shows the number of situations which are assigned to the individual
states of the capsule plant controller. For example there are 24 situations which can be assigned to the state
filling/mixing. We can interpret these situations as scenarios for the suitable states.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
initialization filling/mixing mixing draining ready stopped
Figure 7. Amount of situations according to the states of the capsule plant controller
The design of the qualitative software model is oriented on the UML-RT structure model. Due to the determined
message channels, only certain messages can be exchanged between the two capsules and their environment.
This fact is described with system equations. Subsequently, the calculation of the qualitative software model
takes place with the help of a program. Only 50 situations of the 108 situations of the capsule plant controller
are suitable for the desired communication protocol with the capsule plant specifications.
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5.3 Human Task
How do we model human behavior with SQMA? We consider the operator as a black box and are only interested
on his possibilities to interact with the system. His access to the system is also represented with terminals of the
component human. Generally, the human task can be divided into concurrent tasks or single tasks and tasks  as
answer of messages (reactive tasks) or tasks which do not rely on messages (active tasks). In the presented
example an operator has different possibilities to interact with the process: He can open the door of the tank, start
(active task), terminate or abort the process and set new values for the filling level. Because of the system
structure, he can't open the door of the tank and change current process values at the same time, so these
interventions are single tasks. Additionally he receives information from the software about the process status.
Therefore in this example the component “human” has three terminals (Figure 8). The quantities of the terminals
are also described with interval variables.
Human
Taskprocess
status
orders
door
access
Figure 8. Operator as a black box
For example the qualitative variable for the new filling level contains all possible values from negative to
positive infinite. This means that the operator can set any value. Actions of a human can easily be expressed in a
qualitative way (e.g. open the tank door, shut it, or do nothing).
5.4 Composition of the Single Models
To connect the models of the technical process and the software, additionally, the necessary actuators and
sensors can be modelled. Software information is converted into physical quantities, or vice versa. A qualitative
modeling of the field peripherals additionally enables the possibility of analyzing the system behavior with
defective actuators or sensors.
Before the situations of the whole system can be calculated, the three model must be joined together. The basic
idea is to combine all possible situations of the three models . Therefore the interactions between these parts are
important. The structure of the computer-controlled system represents the possible interactions and serves as the
base for the combination. The situations of the three different models must fit together. For example a situation
of the technical process presents a scenario for an open inlet valve. This situation only can be connected with an
adequate situation from the qualitative model of the controller software: For example the capsule plant controller
is in the state filling/mixing  and therefore the manipulated variable for inlet valve has the value open. This means
no conflict to the mentioned situation of the technical process; these two situations fit together.
A valid situation triple of the different models form a so-called system situation, which represent one special
scenario for the whole system. For the homogenising plant, combinatorial 58210 situations are to be expected.
The specified system structure reduced the number of possible situations to 49.
5.5 The Safety Analysis
Now, the analyst must examine the system situations with respect of their meaning for safety. The status of the
situations helps the analyst to examine the system safety. In the situation table, Table 2, an extract of the result is
shown. The first row contains the components of a special system part. For example the computer-supported
analysis has discovered, that a situation can happen in which the inlet valve is open, the tank is filled and the
mixer is running, the drain valve is closed. An adequate state of the controller software is that the capsule plant
controller is in the state filling/mixing and the capsule plant specification is in the state inputs blocked. By
evaluating the attributes of the situations of the system parts, the computer declares this situation as intended.
We can compare the system situations to a snapshot of the controlled system. In our example we have 36
situations, which are scenarios of the normal operation mode of the homogenizing plant. A program sorts the
system situations into intended (normal), not-intended and dangerous operation. The safety analysis consist in
examine the not-intended and particularly the dangerous situations.
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technical process controller software human status
inlet
valve
tank drain
valve
plant controller plant specification human task
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
opened contains fluid
mixer on
door closed
closed filling/mixing inputs blocked nothing intended
closed full
mixer off
door opened
closed initialization ready open door dangerous
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 2: An extract from the situation table of the homogenizing plant.
For the homogenizing plant 6 not-intended operation modes of the systems are detected:
· Inlet valve is triggered, but there is no flow through the valve (4 situations)
These situations show the analyst, that the cause of this fact is a blocked inlet valve or a run dry of the
source. The analyst can get further information from the model. The above-mentioned situations only occur
when the capsule plant controller is in the state filling/mixing. The evaluation of the dynamical behavior
(the transitions) shows that this state could not be left. In reality, this means a deadlock of the system. Now
the analyst has to interpret this result. In this case, the developed controller software is not able to detect
whether water actually flows into the tank or not. This means that the current software design can’t act upon
this event.
The next step is to evaluate if this event is probable. And if so the analyst has to think about a solution. For
example, this deadlock problem can be solved with an extension of the software design. We can specify a
new capsule monitor. The function of this new capsule is a temporal monitoring of the level of the tank. The
user will get a message, if the current level of tank and the expected one are inconsistent.
· Drain valve is triggered, but there is no flow through the valve (3 situations)
Something similar occurs with the state draining of capsule plant controller. It is also not detected by the
software whether water actually flows out of the tank or not. This is obvious in the situations when the drain
valve is blocked. This problem can be solved with the solution described above.
The discussed not-intended situations don't mean a risk for humans and environment, they only are important to
the correct functioning of the plant. But the analysis has shown 6 dangerous situations of the homogenizing
plant.
· Liquid flows out through the door of the tank (6 situations)
With the developed software it can happen that liquid flows out from the open door of the tank. Depending
upon the type and amount of the liquid the consequences can be differently serious. Nevertheless these
system situations should never occur during the normal operation mode. Here, the qualitative model helps to
detect a design error of the controller software. These dangerous situations can occur only if the capsule
plant controller is in the state initialization. If an analyst considers these situations, he will soon notice the
causes for this failure: the process conditions at the beginning of the process is not checked by the software
during its initialization. If e.g. in a previous operation of the system the process was aborted by a user, liquid
can still be in the tank. When restarting the system the door is unlocked again and the users has the
possibility to open it or not.
Therefore the developers of the software are forced to change the software design. The state transition
diagram of the capsule plant controller is not sufficiently specified. A possible solution is to extend the
statechart by a state checking process status. This new state has the function to lock the door first and only
change into the state initialization if the tank does not contain any liquid. In the other case, the user is
informed immediately and the state is changed into draining .
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When the discussed modifications of the software design are made, the new design can be modeled once more
and integrated into the model for the system. After the renewed analysis of the model, the dangerous situations
shouldn’t exist. But if so there must be new failures in the design and the analyst has to think about it again.
6 Summary and Outlook
The presented example shows, how computer aided safety analyses can be realized with the help of the
qualitative modeling. Instead of brainstorming, the computer combines all possible situation of the technical
process, the controller software and human task. The intended operation modes are checked under any
conditions, moreover the analysis distinguishes between intended, not-intended and dangerous situations of the
system. This helps the analyst to judge the system safety. A further advantage of the model-based approach is
that the result is reproducible at any time. Thereby, the quality of the safety analysis can rise noticeably.
The example demonstrates how complex the interaction between the system parts can be, even for a small
example. For larger systems it is almost impossible to discover or analyze several failures at the same time by
conventional methods.
Like other modeling techniques the quality of the result depends strongly on the underlying model. The
component-oriented view of the presented qualitative model creates outstanding prerequisites for support by a
library containing checked model-components. Similarly to conventional CAD-Systems, models could be
created on a graphic level comfortably.
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